The role of tax competition in internal territorial tax regimes: Federal States and the European Union
This paper carries out a reflection, from a comparative perspective, on tax competition within the federal states, especially in the countries of America and Europe. For this, the authors explain the different aspects of the problem: fiscal competition; the decentralization and federalism and its fiscal effect; the fiscal federalism; and the tax competition in federal states. The authors seek to explain these phenomena and evaluate the positive and negative arguments that have been given about tax competition in this context. The authors describe how fiscal decentralization and fiscal competition are phenomena that have overpassed the Federal States and has been extended to countries with other forms of State.
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